Saturday, April 18, 2015

The Fish War

The Turf Battle

Fish consumption advisories have been around since the 70’s, when the main concern was contamination of fish with PCB’s.  Since then, every state health department issues lake-specific advisories for recreationally caught fish, and a branch was established in the EPA Office of Water in 1993 to coordinate advisories among and with state health departments.  While PCB’s and other contaminants are occasionally the impetus for fish consumption advice, the main culprit is usually methylmercury.  Typically, these guidelines were designed to keep consumers exposure below the Reference Dose.  That doesn’t sound so bad, and it wouldn’t be if the RfD was thought of as a rough guideline (e.g. like yellow traffic warning signs).  But, because the EPA speaks of the RfD as a fact, it is trouble.

The USFDA initially attempted to limit exposure to methylmercury in fish by setting action levels and attempting to ban swordfish.  However, the legal authority that the USFDA has over contaminants in food proved to be too limited.  There was also a serious practical limitation; given the wide variation of methylmercury levels in different fish, even in the same species, enforcing an action level would require testing individual fish.  So, beginning in 1995, the USFDA also began to use consumption advisories for methylmercury.  The first one advised pregnant women to consume shark and swordfish no more than once a month, and a later advisory issued in 2001. 

Shortly thereafter, an FDA advisory committee suggested that in order to avoid conflicting advice from the federal government, FDA and the EPA should issue advice jointly.  With some difficulty, this happened. Both agencies agreed on what advice should be given, which in addition to restricting consumption of particular species of fish, suggesting an overall limit of 12 ozs of fish per week.  However, in no way was the rationale for the advice agreed upon.  For the EPA, the 12 oz limit was necessary to prevent the Reference Dose from being exceeded, while for the FDA the 12 oz limit allowed consumers to avoid the risk of not eating enough fish.

Part of the conflict arises from the regulatory role of the offices involved.   The Division of Seafood in the FDA has a mandate to regulate seafood sold in interstate commerce, while the fish advisory group at the EPA is primarily concerned with recreational fish.  So, while the FDA Division of Seafood regulates a business, the EPA Office of Water doesn’t.  But, that hasn’t stopped the Office of Water from broadening its scope to include commercial seafood.  So, a big part of the Fish War is a conflict over keeping control of the decision process.  By using the RfD as an instrument of control, the EPA has sought to extend the RfD-based rationale for recreational advisories.  Even if the advice is agreed upon, the USFDA has felt compelled to have a more defensible rationale for audience that includes both consumers and a regulated industry. 

Not having gotten the memo about the need for coordinated federal fish consumption advice, the 2010 Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA) was jointly issued by USDA and a non-FDA component of HHS.  This advice was close to the joint EPA/FDA advisory, but instead of a consumption limit, it gives a recommended consumption range of 8-12 ozs/week.  The EPA and FDA once again got together to craft an advisory that would be consistent with the DGA guidelines, and once again they agreed on the advice without agreeing on the rationale.  The USFDA used a risk assessment that considered both risks and benefits of consuming fish (USFDA, 2014), while the EPA still prefers to tout the RfD.  The USEPA stood pat with the Reference Dose.   The 2015 Dietary Guidelines are now out, and they have advised the EPA and FDA to drop the specific recommendation for albacore.  The turf battle seems to have expanded to another front.

Dueling Paradigms


The paradigm battle is related to the turf battle.  But it isn’t really about just methylmercury or fish; it’s about how decisions get made.    As only one instance of the conflict that arises when shell gamers confront nonplayers, it transcends methylmercury and fish.  As an object lesson about the interaction between science and politics in general, it transcends chemical contaminants in food.  It’s about the pursuit of control vs. the pursuit of truth.  It’s about Neo vs. the Machines and it’s a Treatise on Human Nature.

Using the RfD as the basis for personal policy shares some of the same limitations as when it is used for public policy – it provides the personal policy maker (aka a consumer) very little information.  Using the RfD as the basis for a food consumption advisory may tell a person what to do, but it doesn’t say why (e.g. see Goyer letter).  A quantitative risk assessment (QRA) does.  For example, using several different models (Carrington and Bolger, 2000; Axelrad et al, 2007), the risk at the RfD is a reduction of about 0.2 IQ points, give or take a factor of 2.  Micromanaging fish consumption around the RfD isn’t going the change the fact that the risk is still about 0.2 IQ points regardless of whether or not the exposure is a little more or a little less than the RfD.  Furthermore, since some of the methylmercury comes from unknown non-fish sources (USEPA, 2013), not all of the risk is avoidable in any case.
 
The EPA Office of Water does not have any use for quantitative risk assessment.  They do not want estimates that are approximately correct no matter how approximately correct they are.  So, it really isn’t a disagreement over the science.  Furthermore, the paradigm conflict doesn’t follow agency borders.  Using the dose-response characterization developed by the EPA Office of Air (Axelrad et al, 2007) instead of our own (Carrington and Bolger, 2000) didn’t placate them at all.  Proponents of shell-game infused safety assessment paradigm within the Department of Health and Human Services haven’t been very appreciative of QRA either.  Unless it somehow magically makes the RfD actually become a threshold with no variability or uncertainty, any dose-response characterization is going to make the RfD for methylmercury irrelevant.  If you think the RfD is a source of great moral precautionary authority, that would be bad.  Nonetheless, as a result of the efforts of a steadfast turf warrior (not me), the FDA QRA is presented on the FDA website (USFDA, 2014).   Unlike the joint advisory, the risk-benefit assessment belongs only to the FDA.

To Be Continued

As an ex-FDA employee, the turf battle is over for me.  I joined as a soldier in the war, but it never really did interest me.  However, the paradigm battle is far from over.  In fact, I hope to be able to fight it more effectively without the entanglements of bureaucratic interests.  The paradigm battle has a political cause that can only have a political solution.  For dueling with the shell game, the FDA presentation of the QRA is less than ideal.  When the consumer is the risk manager, the QRA needs a more personal presentation.

References

Axelrad D.A., Bellinger, D.C., Ryan L.M., and Woodruff T.J. (2007), Dose-Response Relationship of Prenatal Mercury Exposure and IQ:  An Integrative Analysis of Epidemiological Data.  Environmental Health Perspectives

Carrington, CD and Bolger, PM (2000).  A Pooled Analysis of the Iraqi and Seychelles Methylmercury Studies.  Human Ecological Risk Assessment 6:323-340.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2013).  Trends in Blood Mercury Concentrations and Fish Consumption Among U.S. Women of Childbearing Age NHANES, 1999-2010.  Final Report July 2013 EPA-823-R-13-002


USFDA and USEPA (2014).  Fish: What Pregnant Women and Parents Should Know.  Draft Updated Advice by FDA and EPA / June 2014. 


U.S. Department of Agriculture (2010).  Dietary Guidelines – 2010

Official Post Soundtrack

Cliff, Jimmy (1989).  The Grass is Greener.  In: Images, Track 12.

Post Note

Thesis Post #31.  First post as an ex-Federal employee.  

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